Why are Fresh Produce Prices So Unstable in Lusaka? Insights for Policy and Investment Priorities. by Hichaambwa, Munguzwe & Tschirley, David L.
  1
POLICY SYNTHESIS 
FOOD SECURITY RESEARCH PROJECT - ZAMBIA 
Ministry of Agriculture & Cooperatives, Agricultural Consultative Forum, Michigan State University - Lusaka Zambia 
Number 41                       (Downloadable at http://wwwaec.msu.edu/agecon/fs2/zambia/index.htm)                      June 2010 
 
WHY ARE FRESH PRODUCE PRICES SO UNSTABLE IN LUSAKA? INSIGHTS 
FOR POLICY AND INVESTMENT PRIORITIES 
 
Munguzwe Hichaambwa and David Tschirley 
 
Main Points 
1.  Daily quantities of tomato, rape and onion entering Soweto market in Lusaka fluctuate 
dramatically 
2.  The market does a remarkable job of moderating the impact on prices of these unstable 
quantities, through stabilizing mechanisms such as short-term storage of tomato and rape by 
traders and consumers, longer-term storage of onion by traders, direct sourcing of rape from 
farm areas by retail traders, and exportation of tomato and onion outside Lusaka. 
3.  Yet even with these stabilizing mechanisms, wholesale prices are highly variable, with 
negative effects on farmers and consumers.   
4.  Reducing variability requires investments in four areas: (a) improved control of production 
environments by farmers through irrigation, better access to inputs and greater agronomic 
knowledge, (b) improved vertical flow of information from farmers to traders to brokers to 
retailers, (c) a regulatory framework for broker activity to improve trust and information flow 
between brokers and sellers, and (d) improved market infrastructure. 
 
INTRODUCTION:  Rapid urbanization and 
renewed per capita income growth are creating 
new opportunities for African farmers of fresh 
produce.  Yet these same factors are putting 
great stress on the already overburdened 
traditional marketing systems that dominate 
fresh produce marketing across most of Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA).   
 
The poor performance of many of these systems 
is widely known.  Yet little comparative 
knowledge has been generated to quantify the 
range of observed performance across countries. 
Such knowledge is a necessary first step in 
designing policies and programs that improve 
farmer and consumer welfare.  We begin filling 
this knowledge gap in this Policy Synthesis by 
examining the price behavior of tomato, rape, 
and onion in the marketing system serving 
Lusaka. These crops are perhaps the three main 
“staple vegetables” in East and southern Africa, 
eaten on a daily basis by most people; in Lusaka, 
they account for more than half of all vegetable 
consumption.   Policy Syntheses 39 and 40, and 
Research Report 46 provide additional analysis 
for the interested reader. 
 
DATA Primary data for this study come from 
three sources.  The Food Security Research 
Project (ACF/FSRP, carried out in collaboration 
with the Agricultural Consultative Forum) has 
collaborated with the Zambia National Farmers’ 
Union (ZNFU) since January 2007 to collect 
detailed information on prices and quantities of 
tomato, rape, and onion in Lusaka’s dominant 
wholesale market (Soweto). On Monday, 
Wednesday, and Friday of each week, market 
reporters collect information on all trucks 
entering the market with the three products.   
These data allow computation of total volumes 
and values flowing through Soweto.  Market 
reporters also interview traders on the 
destination of product leaving Soweto.  
 
 
PRICE SEASONALITY:  Seasonal indices are 
a common way to portray the movement of 
prices over a “typical” year.  They show the 
average percent by which prices in each of the 
12 months differ from average prices over the 
surrounding 12 month period.  We additionally 
assess the stability of this seasonal price pattern 
by plotting three lines: the seasonal index, and 
the index plus and minus a 25% “confidence   2
interval”.  The resulting bound is a 50% 
confidence interval on the index; 25% of daily 
price observations fall below the lower line and 
25% above the upper line
1. 
 




Soweto, tomato is 
expected to show 
seasonal supply 
peaks (low price 
periods), 
immediately after 
the wet season 
from April to 
October, with 
very little supply 
and high prices in 
the rainy season 
from November to 
March. For rape 
we expect one 
long season of 
high supply and 
low prices during 
the dry months of 
May to 
November.  Onion 
is expected to be 
similar to tomato, 
with low supplies 
and high prices 












(Figure 1).  The 
50% confidence 
intervals on the tomato seasonal index are also 
the widest, especially during the anticipated high 
price season of May through July.  In fact, 
                                                 
1   See Research Report 46 for details on how the index 
and confidence intervals were calculated.  
during only one month (August) did daily 
tomato prices have a better than 75% probability 
of lying above (below) the mean price over the 
period of analysis when the mean index lied 
above (below) it





the mean; June, 
August and 
September below it) 
while onion prices 
did so during seven 
months (April-June 
above the mean; 
October-February 
below it).  This 
instability in 
tomato’s seasonal 
price pattern is 
linked to known 
problems with 
groundwater 
availability in key 
producing areas, 
and potentially also 
to difficulty in 
managing disease 
outbreaks.  Rape’s 
seasonal pattern is 
more stable because 
most of it is 
produced in low-
lying areas near 
river banks during 
the dry season, 
minimizing the risk 
of water shortages 
and (by producing 
less during the rainy 
season) avoiding 





primarily from the 
ability of traders to draw from a wider 
geographic range to supply Lusaka.  Note, 
                                                 
2   These months are identified by the top line lying below 
the mean when the index is below it, or the bottom line 




   Figure 1.  Seasonal Price Indices for Tomato, Rape, 
and Onion in Lusaka   3
however, that onion shows the greatest (though 
stable across years) total seasonal variation 
among the three crops, with seasonal highs of 
1.5 times the mean price, and lows of 0.5; 
equivalent figures were 1.2 and 0.62 for tomato, 
and 1.65 and 0.7 for rape. 
 
Figure 2 shows the observed price patterns of the 
three crops during the entire study period. While 
the expected low price periods for tomato were 
April and May and then from August to October, 
analysis shows that the period of low prices 
during 2007 actually extended over the entire 
period from April to October, though there were 
small peaks and troughs within this period.  The 
seasonal pattern in 2008 diverged sharply from 
expectations around April/May due to problems 
accessing irrigation water in Lusaka West, one 
of the major supply areas. Price patterns for rape 
and onion largely followed expectations.  
 
PRICE VARIABILITY: Perishable 
commodities depend on some combination of 
cold storage, strong information flows between 
buyers and sellers, and effective control of 
production environments (through irrigation and 
pest management) to regulate flow of product to 
the market and avoid dramatic price swings.   
South Africa has all three: very large producer-
shippers that dominate that market have cold 
transport and access to the inputs and knowledge 
they need to avoid most dramatic fluctuations in 
output, and brokers operating in the country’s 
wholesale markets communicate constantly with 
producers and buyers to match supply to 
demand.  In Zambia, traditional fresh produce 
supply chains handle over 90% of all marketed 
fresh produce. Production in these chains is 
dominated by small- and medium-scale farmers, 
many of whom have poor access to inputs and 
extension advice and face very high variability 
in yields.  Most sales go into an atomistic retail 
sector that makes it difficult for brokers to 
anticipate demand, even if farmers were able to 
respond to attempts at active coordination by the 
brokers.  Finally, these chains have no cold 
storage, meaning that wholesale prices for 
products like tomato and (especially) rape must 
adjust daily to clear the market.  Under these 
conditions, price variability can be extreme, with 




We first quantify variability in daily prices and 
quantities at wholesale.  The coefficient of 
variation in Table 1 is affected by day-to-day 
fluctuations and by longer seasonal variation; the 
other two measures eliminate seasonal variation 
by focusing on day-to-day variability.  Five 
points stand out. First, daily quantities arriving 
in the market fluctuate dramatically for each 
crop: mean day-to-day changes
4 (absolute value) 
in quantities arriving on the market are 29% for 
tomato, 32% for rape, and 56% for onion.  For 
all three crops, these changes exceed 20% in 
absolute value more than half the time.  Second, 
this variability in quantities drives great 
variability in prices for rape and tomato, which 
see mean day-to-day absolute price changes of 
30% and 20%, respectively.  Third, in all cases, 
prices vary less day-to-day than do quantities. 
This differential is dramatic for onion (which has 
the highest variability in quantities) but is 
explained by the storability of this crop, which 
allows market supply to differ from quantities 
arriving at the market (volumes put into storage 
are not offered for sale).  For rape and tomato, 
neither of which can be stored to any significant 
degree, the pattern suggests a perhaps surprising 
willingness of consumers to alter their 
consumption in response to price changes.   
Finally, tomato prices vary substantially less 
day-to-day than do rape prices, despite 
comparable variability in quantities.   
 
We explore the mechanisms behind these last 
two points below.  We now examine price 
behavior more formally by estimating price 
flexibilities for each crop.  Price flexibilities are 
a common measure of price behavior, showing 
the % change in prices for 1% change in 
quantities arriving on the market.  Note that high 
price flexibilities are associated with less 
flexible and less stable systems: systems that are 
less able to slow down or speed up the flow of 
product from farmer to consumer in response to 
changing circumstances and in which, for
                                                 
3   See Mwiinga 2009 for a detailed assessment of 
production and price risk for tomato in Zambia. 
4   Note that all these calculations are based on Monday-
Wednesday-Friday data collection, meaning that two 
thirds of the computed “day-to-day” changes occur over 
two days, and one third over three days.   4
Figure 2.  Seasonality of Wholesale Prices in Soweto Market 
Tomato
































Expected high price season 
(Apr-Jul)
 
Source: FSRP Vegetable Market Volumes and Prices Monitoring Data, January 2007 to January 2009.   5
Table 1.  Selected Measures 0f Variability in Prices and Quantities for Tomato, Rape, and Onion 
(Soweto, 15 January 2007 to 16 November 2009) 
Tomato Rape  Onion 
Variability measure  Price Quantity    Price Quantity    Price Quantity 
CV 0.51  0.31    0.48  0.41    0.41  0.47 
Mean day-to-day absolute % change 20%  29%    30%  32%    7% 56% 
Share of day-to-day changes > 20%  39%  51%    52%  56%    5%  64% 
Source: FSRP Vegetable Market Volumes and Prices Monitoring Data, January 2007 to January 2009. 
 
that reason, prices must bear the brunt of any 
adjustment.  High price flexibilities mean high 
price instability for a given instability in 
quantities arriving on a market; when these 
quantities are themselves highly variable, the 
resulting price instability can impose high costs 
on farmers and consumers.  Marketing systems 
as a result seek ways to reduce price flexibility. 
 
Because our three crops are “staple vegetables” 
consumed on a nearly daily basis by most 
households, we expect their demand to be price 
inelastic: we don’t expect consumers to greatly 
reduce or increase their purchases in response to 
price changes. In the extreme case of zero 
storage due to perishability, we would expect 
fluctuations in quantities to drive proportionally 
larger changes in price; price flexibilities would 
lie above unity.  In the case where some very 
short-term storage (2-3 days) is possible, 
flexibilities in high frequency data (e.g., daily) 
could lie below unity, rising and eventually 
exceeding unity as data frequency diminishes 
(e.g., from daily to weekly to monthly).    
 
Storage can in principle occur at four levels in 
the system: farm, wholesale, among retailers, 
and among consumers.  Storage on farm is not 
relevant to our analysis, since our quantity data 
is for volumes arriving at the market. These data 
show that ending stocks of tomato and rape 
average only 15% and 2%, respectively 
(compared to 89% for onion), of daily volumes 
arriving at the market; rape is essentially not 
stored at wholesale, and tomato storage is also 
very low.  On the other hand, we know that 
retailers frequently keep tomatoes for 2-3 days, 
and may even keep rape until the next day if 
they don’t sell it all.  UCS data indicates that 
45% of Lusaka consumers own a refrigerator 
(Hichaambwa, et al, 2009), suggesting that some 
of these households may be able to store 2-3 
days’ supply of rape and perhaps a week to 10 
days’ supply of tomato.  
 
 
Our channel maps (Policy Synthesis 40 and 
Research Report 46) show that retailers purchase 
a large share of their rape directly from farmers.  
This provides another avenue for reducing price 
flexibility, as retailers can arbitrage between 
purchases from farmers and brokers at Soweto 
depending on relative prices.  We also know that 
retailers buy entire plots of rape and can harvest 
it over a (short) period of time, effectively 
storing it in the field.  The channel maps also 
show a final potential mechanism for reducing 
price flexibility: shipping outside of Lusaka.  If 
these shipments can be made on short notice, in 
response to large arrivals in Soweto, or delayed 
when little product arrives, they will reduce 
price flexibility; if instead they are contracted 
and must be shipped on an agreed schedule, they 
can increase price instability. Given what we 
know of how the marketing system functions, 
we expect the former situation to prevail and 
therefore expect that these shipments will reduce 
price flexibility.  Note that rape is not shipped 
outside of Lusaka, suggesting another reason, in 
addition to its greater perishability, to expect 
high estimated price flexibilities.   
 
We estimated two models for each crop: one 
with daily data and one with weekly data (Table 
2; see Research Report 46 for full econometric 
results).  Based on the discussion above, we 
expect price flexibilities to be well below unity 
for onion in both models, highest for rape in 
both models, and substantially lower for tomato 
and rape in the daily than in the weekly model.  
 
Table 2.  Summary Results on Price 
Flexibility Estimations 
 Tomato  Rape  Onion 
# of daily obs  357  353  343 
# of weekly obs  139  140  137 
Daily flexibility  -0.28***  -0.791***  -0.001 
Wkly flexibility  -0.891***  -0.966***  -0.091***
*** significant at 1% 
 
Results strongly confirm these expectations.   
Daily onion prices are unaffected by the same   6
day’s quantity, being driven entirely by seasonal 
fluctuations in supply and by the previous day’s 
price; together these explain nearly all the 
variation in the daily onion price.  Onion’s price 
flexibility becomes statistically significant but 
remains small in the weekly model.  Rape has 
the highest flexibility, at -0.79 in the daily model 
and nearly unity in the weekly model.  The fact 
that rape’s price flexibility does not exceed unity 
even in the weekly model – well beyond the time 
that the product can be stored except in 
refrigerators – suggests that retail traders’ direct 
purchases from farmers (and perhaps other 
factors we are unaware of) act to stabilize 
wholesale market prices of this crop.  Tomato 
has quite a low flexibility in the daily model (-
0.28), suggesting that storage of 2-3 days at 
retail and consumer levels is common, and 
probably also that shipments outside of Lusaka 
stabilize the market.  This crop’s flexibility rises 
markedly in the weekly model, to -0.89.   
 
CONCLUSIONS: All in all, this analysis 
suggests that Lusaka’s traditional marketing 
system has found ways to reduce the effects on 
prices of fluctuations in quantities arriving on 
the market, despite no cold chain below the 
consumer level and difficulty coordinating 
supplies between a large number of small 
farmers and small traders.  It is notable that 
flexibilities for tomato and rape remain below 
unity even beyond the time period that retailers 
and most households can reasonably be expected 
to store these products; shipment of tomato 
outside of Lusaka and procurement of rape 
directly from farmers are the two most likely 
mechanisms driving this result. 
 
Yet even with these stabilizing mechanisms, 
wholesale prices are highly variable, due to even 
greater variability in daily quantities.  This 
variability imposes real costs on farmers and 
consumers.  Reducing variability requires 
investments in at least four areas.  First, farmers 
need to be assisted to better control their 
production environments, though irrigation, 
better access to inputs, greater agronomic 
knowledge about which inputs to use and how, 
and ideally, early warning type information on 
threats from crop pests.  Second, the vertical 
flow of information in the system, from farmers 
to traders to brokers to retailers, need to be 
improved so that demand and supply can be 
more closely matched without the dramatic price 
fluctuations that market participants current 
experience.  Continual information flows 
spanning farmers to retailers through brokers, is 
a fundamental feature of well performing fresh 
produce systems.  Third, improved physical 
market infrastructure at wholesale, while not 
directly contributing to price stability, is a sine 
qua non for broader improvements, given the 
deplorable state of the Soweto wholesaling area. 
Note that we are not at this point suggesting 
investment in a cold chain, and certainly not 
public investment.  Basic improvements in 
physical infrastructure, together with improved 
production practices and information flows, 
should be given higher priority at this point in 
Zambia’s development.  Finally, one likely 
benefit of an effective regulatory framework to 
govern the behavior of brokers (see Policy 
Synthesis 39) is improved trust on the part of 
farmers and other sellers, potentially leading to 
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